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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CORPORATION NINE, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
RAY L. TAYLOR and
NEV A W. TAYLOR, his wife,
Defendants-Respondents.

RAY L. TAYLOR and
NEVA W. TAYLOR, hiswife,

Case No.

12983

Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

CORPORATION NINE, a Utah
corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

DEFENDANTS'-RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
NATIJRE OF THE CASE
The actions involved in the two lawsuits joined for trial
in the District Court arose out of a real estate contract for
50 acres of land entered into between Corporation Nine, appellant, as buyer, and Ray L. Taylor and Neva W. Taylor,
his wife, respondents, as sellers. The Taylors gave notice of
termination of the contract claiming default in payment. Corporation Nine filed suit against Taylors for specific perform1

ance and damages, and Taylors filed suit against Corporation
Nine and John New to have the title to the property quieted
in Taylors and for interest, costs and attorney's fees.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court entered judgment for Taylors dismissing
Corporation Nine's complaint, dismissed John New from the
Taylors' action against him, and granted judgment to Taylors
against Corporation Nine quieting title in them and awarded
interest, costs and attorney's fees to Taylors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Taylors, respondents, seek an affirmance of the trial
court's judgment except as to the amount awarded for attorney's fees and ask for an order from the Supreme Court remanding the case back to the trial court to take evidence on
the amount of attorney fees. Respondents also ask for attorneys
fees in connection with the appeal. Corporation Nine, appellant,
seeks a reversal of the trial court's decision, for an order requiring specific performance or in the alternative for damages, costs and attorney's fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Both of the lawsuits involved in this appeal arose out of
a contract for purchase of land dated the 24th day of January,
1968, in which Ray 1. Taylor and Neva W. Taylor, his wife,
as sellers, agreed to sell to Corporation Nine, as buyer, 50
acres of land described as:
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The South 120 rds of the W. Y:z of the N.W. Y4, and
Lot 1, Sec. 36, Twp. 2 S., Range 1 East, S. L.B. & M.,
and commencing at S.W. Y4 of Sec. 36, E. 792', N.
10 rds, E. 528', N. 70 rds; West 80 rds, S. 80 rds to
point of beginning, containing 124.58 acres in total,
less the S.W. 30.0 acres and the N. 44.58 acres, making a total net acreage involved in this agreement of
50.0 acres and further described as being a 50.0 acre
tract adjoining Esquire Estates No. 1 Subdivision on the
South and extending North to form a straight line E.
and W. and leaving a remainder of 44.58 acres in the
present Taylor property which before this agreement
contained 94.58 acres. (See Exhibit 2, Plat of 50
acres)
The contract which was prepared by the attorney for
Corporation Nine ( R. 104) provided for a purchase price of
$240,000.00 with $20,000.00 to be paid down at time of
the execution of the contract and $25,000.00 annually thereafter (Exhibit 1). The $25,000.00 annual payment was insisted upon by Mr. Taylor so that he could have an annual income from said contract in that amount ( R. 250). The contract called for the accrual of interest on the balance at the
rate of 4 Sr per annum commencing March 1, 1969 (Exhibit
1) .
The contract further provided that upon the payment of
the down payment of $20,000.00 the seller was to convey by
warranty deed to the buyer fee title to six acres of land in
accordance with the plat (Exhibit 2). On the 1st of March,
1969, the buyer was to receive an additional five acres contiguous to the initial six acres and appropriate to development of
the entire parcel by warranty deed in exchange for $25,000.00
and on each succeeding March I st thereafter in like manner
until the full ~240,000.00 was paid including interest with
each annual payment.

Possession of the land was to be delivered to the buyer
as each parcel was paid for and the seller was to continue to pay
the taxes and retain possession of all unconveyed land.
The contract further provided that the buyer had no
privilege of pre-payment other than consistent with the terms
of the agreement, unless prior written consent was obtained
from the sellers.
The contract also provided that in the event of failure to
comply with the terms by the buyer or upon failure of the
buyer to make any payment or payments when the same became due, or within 30 days thereafter, after written notice the
seller had the right upon failure of the buyer to remedy the
default within five ( 5) days of the receipt of the written notice
to be released from the contract and that time was of the essence of the contract (Exhibit 1).
The contract provided for payment of reasonable attorney's fees by the defaulting party (Exhibit 1).
The land involved in the agreement is located east of
Wasatch Boulevard at approximately 7800 South (See Exhibit 2). Within a few days after the execution of the contract Taylor executed a deed for 6.567 acres and received in
exchange $20,000.00 cash and a promissory note for
$12,835.00. Taylor testified that when the original discussion
took place with respect to the sale of the land they discussed
only the sum of $5,000.00 per acre (R. 249, 262) with a
down payment of $30,000.00 for six acres (R. 245). Taylor
was living in California at the time of the execution of the
contract (R. 246). New went to Taylor's home in California
4

have him sign the contract and at that time New told Taylor
he was unable to get the full amount of the $30,000.00, but
Valley State Bank would loan him $20,000.00 and that New
would give him a note for $10,000.00 and a second mortgage
on the land that Taylor had conveyed to him (R. 246, 247).
New asked Taylor not to record the mortgage so the bank
would not know (R. 248). Taylor objected to taking a note,
but New said he would pay it off in a few months. After
returning to Salt Lake New called Taylor on the phone and
claimed he needed an additional .567 acres to round out the
lots so there would not be parts of lots left over ( R. 262) (See
also Exhibit 2-Plat) New said he would make the note for
$12,835.00 (R. 263). The note, (Exhibit D-33), mortgage
(Exhibit P. 3 5), and $20,000.00 were sent to Taylor by Security Title. The note had been made payable in three years
instead of six months ( R. 248). The contract provided for
payment of $240,000.00 for the 50 acres and this was the first
occasion Taylor knew of the $240,000.00 purchase price m
the contract (R. 247-8).
to

The note was finally paid in June of 1971 after a lawsuit
was filed on the note and to foreclose the mortgage (R. 250).
The note did not provide for interest (Exhibit D-33) but when
Taylor talked to New about not paying it in six months, New
said he would pay interest on the note ( R. 282).
New admitted that he and Taylor had agreed upon a
payment of $30,000.00 for the initial six acres but claimed that
it was on a release of $5,000.00 per acre (R. 118). When his
deposition was taken, he admitted that the whole contract was
$250,000.00 for the 50 acres (R. 118-119). He denied at
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the trial that it \vas for $250,000.00 (R. 118, 623, 624) but
admitted to the following questions and answers given at the
deposition:
R. 118, L. 26

Q.

Now when I questioned you at the time your
deposition was taken you told me that it was
($250,000.00 for 50 acres) didn't you?

119, L. 6

A.

Yes.

17
Q.

And you said it was $250,000.00 for 50 acres,
didn't you?

L. 9

A.

I said yes, I said yes.

R. 119, L. 23
Q. Now you told me initially also that the agreed
price per acre for the 50 acres was $5,000.00 an
acre did you not, at the time I took your deposition.

L. 27
A.

If I did, it was meant as a release fee.

Q.

Just tell me whether or not you did.

A.

Then I say negative.

L. 30

Q.

Now would you please refer to your deposition
at Page 16, L. 10: Q. What was the agreed
price per acre of land that you were buying under
the contract?

R. 120, L. 3

A.

$5,000.00 per acre.
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L.9

Q.

An_d then I asked you, did I not, whether you had
paid for any acreage that you had not received,
and your answer was "no'', was it not?

L. 16
A.

Yes.

L. 28

Q.

And then on page 17, is it not true at line 9 that
I asked you - line 7: "Now then, the contract
states, I believe, $240,000.00 but actually the
price was not that, was it?"

R. 121, L.
And your answer on line 9: "Well, it was $250,000.00
and then this promissory note made up the difference
between the 240 and the 250."
In each instance the witness changed the above answers
before filing his deposition with the court but after transcription ( R. 119-121 ) .
Early in 1969 New approached Taylor and told him that
he was trying to get the Home Show on the land and that the
Home Show was interested in having the show on the land.
Taylor told New he would be interested in hearing what the
financing was, and Mr. \Vells of Valley State Bank called
Taylor on the phone and talked to him about the transaction
(R. 252, 111). New contacted Taylor and told him he needed additional acreage to put on the Home Show. Taylor agreed
to sell him some additional land (R. 112). In February, 1969,
Taylor sold to New three separate parcels of land to be used
in connection with the Home Show. One tract was 8.618
acres, one 4.45 acres and one 1.18 acres. The 1.18 acres was
7

outside the 50 acre tract (Exhibit P-2, R. 292, 256). The
court found as a fact that the sale of the 1.18 acres for the
sum of $5,900.00 was not part of the 50 acre tract contemplated in the contract and payment therefor was not a payment
on the acreage covered by the contract ( R. 48).
The 1.18 acres were sold by Taylor to New at the rate
of $5,000.00 per acre which Taylor contended was the acre
price for all the land sold ( R. 262). The 8.618 acres and the
4.45 acres called for payment at the rate of $5,000.00 per
acre and the payments were applied and paid as follows:
8.618 acres at $5,000.00 per acre 4.45 acres - - - - - - Total

$43,090.00
22,250.00
$65,340.00

$25,000.00 was applied to the March 1, 1969 payment.
This was paid on February 17, 1969 (R. 123, 124). The balance of the $43,090.00, to wit: $18,090.00 was paid by Valley State Bank to Taylor on January 7, 1970. This payment
was guaranteed by Valley State Bank if Taylor released the
land so they could have the Home Show (R. 253). Valley
State Bank and Security Title were acting as escrow agents
(R. 253).
In connection with the sale of the 4.45 acres for
$22,250.00 a written "Letter of Instruction" to Security Title
Company (Exhibit P-5) dated 2-6-69 was signed by both New
on behalf of Corporation Nine and Taylor pertaining only to
the 4.45 acres. In addition to other provisions the "Letter of
Instructions" provides that for the benefit of Corporation Nine
any funds received by Security Title under the terms of this
"Letter of Instructions" shall apply to the annual payment re-
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quired under the contract of purchase (Exhibit 5, Page 1,
Paragraph 3). This was the only authorization for pre-payment between the parties ( R. 27 2) and covered the payment
for March 1, 1970, except for the sum of $2,750.00. The payment of the $22,250.00 was made to Taylor by Security Title
on October 9, 1969, and applied to the payment due March 1,
1970 (R. 255). Taylor didn't bill New for the $2,750.00
balance for that year ( R. 2 5 5 ) . He did send him a statement
fer the interest to become due on March 1, 1970 in the sum
of $6,597.12 which was dated February 10, 1970 (Exhibit
P-6). The payment was not made on the due date and New
wrote Taylor on March 14, 1970, requesting an extension
until June 30, 1970, and agreeing to pay 10% on the interest
due from March 1, 1970, until June 30, 1970 (Exhibit P-7).
On June 20, 1970 Taylor sent a notice of interest payrr.ent due June 30, 1970 for the sum of $6,817.02 (Exhibit
P-8). On July 29, 1970 New sent a letter to Taylor advising
him he would send payment by August 5, 1970 (Exhibit P-9).
On November 19, 1970 New sent a letter and check to Taylor
for the sum of $7,025.98 bringing the interest payment current
(Exhibit P-10).
On February 25, 1971 Taylor sent notice to New advising him of the interest and principal payment due on March
1, 1971 which was $25,000.00 for the principal payment and
$5,837.00 in interest, for a total of $30,837.00 (Exhibit P-13).
New failed to make payment and on the 4th day of April
New was served with a notice by the constable that if the default was nor corrected within five days, the contract was terminated (Exhibit P-14). New tendered a payment of $9,197.00
covering interest of $5,437.00 and principal of $3,760.00

9

(Exhibit P-15 ) which Taylor refused and returned (Exhibit
P-17, R. 136, 137). No tender was ever made of the
$25,000.00 installment due on the 1st of March, 1971 (R.
133).
The trial court found that the contract purchase price was
$240,000.00, that the sale of 1.18 acres was not part of the 50
acres and payment not to be credited toward the 50 acres; that
the principal balance due on March 1, 1971 was $141,825.00
and that the interest due for the period of March 1, 1970 to
March 1, 1971 at 4% was $5,673.00; that Corporation Nine
was in default for failure to make tender of the payment, or
payment of the same, in the sum of $25,000.00 due on March
1, 1971; that the notice given by Taylor to New of default
was proper in all respects and as required by law and gave judgment to Taylor for interest in the sum of $6,099.87 to time
of judgment, an attorney's fee in the amount of $1,000.00,
quieted title in the property to Taylors and dismissed Corporation Nine's action against Taylor (R. 47). The court by
stipulation of counsel agreed to hear evidence pertaining to the
reasonableness of the attorney's fee which was to be done after
the court made its ruling but awarded Taylor $1,000.00 in
attorney's fees in its memorandum decision without hearing
evidence on attorney's fees ( R. 219) .
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ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT ESTOPPED
BY ANY CONDUCT ON THEIR PART TO REFUSE ACCEPTANCE OF PLAINTIFF'S IMPROPER TENDER OF PAYMENT.
The trial court found that appellant, Corporation Nine,
was in default in failing to tender or make the scheduled 1971
payment of $25,000.00 and that the Taylors were not in default in any way on the contract and gave judgment quieting
title to the property in Taylors ( R. 49).
The review by the Supreme Court is in light most favorable to the findings of the trial court. Coombs v. Ouzanian,
24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356.
It is obvious from reading the provisions of the contract
that Taylor's intention in entering into the terms thereof was to
provide himself with an annual income of $25,000.00 per
year and that that sum was to be paid each year in exchange for
five acres of land unless written permission or consent was obtained from the sellers granting the buyer the privilege of prepayment (Exhibit I). Taylor testified that he had insisted
that an annual payment of $25,000.00 be made so that he
could depend on it as an income ( R. 2 50).
The contract was actually prepared by the attorney for
Corporation Nine (R. 104) and in construing the contract it
must be construed most strongly against the party preparing it.
There was, in fact, only two sales of property between the
parties. The original sale was of 6.567 acres when the contract was initiated in January of 1968 and again in February
11

of 1969 when the buyer wanted some extra land so that the
Home Show could be sponsored. In the first instance .567
acres were requested by the buyer and Taylors agreed at the
buyer's request to allow the Corporation to have .567 acres of
land to round out some lots that would otherwise only be partially included in the initial 6 acres (See Exhibit 2). This additional land was paid for by a promissory note in the sum of
$12,835.00.
In the second instance Corporation Nine obtained, at its
request, two tracts of land within the 50 acre tract, one of
8 .618 acres and one of 4 .4 5 acres and also purchased 1. 18
acres outside of the 50 acre tract. The 8.618 acres was paid
for at $5,000.00 per acre, with $25,000.00 being credited to
the 1969 installment due on March 1, 1969 and the balance
of the payment for that acreage, $18,090.00, was paid by
Valley State Bank to Taylor on January 7, 1970. This payment was guaranteed to Taylors by Valley State Bank if Taylor
released the land so Corporation Nine, which was being financed by Valley State Bank, could have the Home Show.
Valley State Bank along with Security Title were acting as
escrow agents ( R. 25 3). Permission was not given Corporation Nine to credit the $18,090.00 as a pre-payment, but
it is significant that Taylors did agree to allow Corporation
Nine to use payment of the $22,250.00 for the 4.45 acres as
a pre-payment for the 1970 payment and pursuant to the provisions of the contract of January 24, 1968, a "Letter of Instructions" was signed by Taylor and also by New on behalf of
Corporation Nine authorizing the payment of the $22,250.00
to be credited to the March 1, 1970 payment (Exhibit 5, Page
1, Paragraph 3). Actually this payment was made through
Security Title to Taylors in October, 1969.
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Counsel for Corporation Nine contends that the sale of
rhe acreage in 1969 was an amendment to the contract, but
the very fact that there was a provision in the contract pertaining to a requirement that pre-payment could not be made without permission in writing naturally infers that the parries anticipate<l there would or could be some transfers of property
over and above the five acres provided for annually but that
the annual payment would still have to be made unless written
permission was otherwise granted. This is, in fact, what happened on this occasion and the "Letter of Instructions" is in
accordance with the provision of the contract and the intent
of the parties under the contract.
There was no basis whatever for Corporation Nine to make
claim that it did not owe a payment of $25,000.00 on March
1, 1971. Plaintiff produced no evidence to show a waiver of
that payment.
Appellant has cited many rules pertammg to equitable
estoppel, that a written contract may be changed, modified or
waived in whole er in part by a subsequent one, express, written, oral or implied, promissory estoppel, and estoppel in pais,
and resondent acknowledges these general rules, but they do
not fit the facts of the case before this court. There is also
a well known rule of law that he who would have equity must
do equity.
The contract between these parties provided that upon
payment of $5,000.00 per acre a deed would be executed by
Taylors to Corporation Nine of that particular acreage paid for
and possession of the land would be delivered to the buyer
of the actual acreage paid for with the seller to retain posses-

sion of and pay the taxes on the unconveyed land. The contract was more on the order of a divisible contract. As is stated
in 17 Am. Jur. 2d at page 760:

If it appears that the purpose is to take the whole or
none, the contract is entire; otherwise, it is severable.
Another test is the possibility or impossibility of a certain apportionment of benefits, according to the compensation in the contract, in case of part performance
only. If the consideration is expressly or by necessary
implication apportioned the contract is severable.
Until the buyer paid the sum of $25,000.00 the seller
had no obligation to convey any land and had, in fact, no
equity whatsoever in the land not paid for and conveyed. It was
more in the nature of a divisible option. Until the payment
was made each year the seller had no obligation to convey.
The interest paid was the consideration for the continuance
of the option. Interest didn't start to accrue until March 1,
1969.
On page 18 of its brief appellant stated that it had expended large sums of money to develop the subdivision with
installation of water, sewer, gas, power, drainage and other
off-site improvements, sufficient to develop the balance of
the ground. No place in appellant's brief does it refer to any
place in the record where such evidence or testimony is shown
or can be found. The only expenditures made by the appellant were on the land actually paid for and conveyed. There
was some storm drainage consisting of an open ditch installed
(R. 237) and the 1.18 acres was purchased for that purpose
(R. 166). The drainage was, in fact, not on the Taylor property (R. 286, See Exhibit P-2). A preliminary subdivision
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plot was prepared by Bush and Gudgell of the whole area (Exhibit P-2), but there is no evidence in the record of any other
expenditure by appellant on the unpaid for and undeeded land.
Appellant claims that he spent money for engineering
and re-zoning of the land and <lid, in fact, have not only the
balance of the 50 acres re-zoned but an additional seven acres
also extc:nding beyond the 50 acre line. In doing so, the appellant in its application (Exhibit P-18) through John New its
agent falsely swore that it was the owner of the property and
then in connection with the hearing failed to give the Taylors
any notice whatever or to list them ;is a property owner. (See
last page of Exhibit P-18). It is interesting to note that New
stated he planned to have the area built within five years. His
oaths meant no more to him than his verbal or written promises. The property was, in fact, re-zoned on March 6, 1970.
(See Exhibit P-31, R. 148-150). The re-zoning was without
the knowledge or authority of Taylor.
The respondent has not at any time misled appellant with
respect to the payments that were to be made. Prior to March
1, 1970 Taylor sent a notice of interest payment due on March
l, 1970. This notice was dated February 10, 1970 (Exhibit
P-6). However, the payment was not made on the due date
and on March 14, 1970 New on behalf of Corporation Nine
wrote Taylor requesting an extension until June 30, 1970
and agreed to pay 10 percent interest on the interest due from
March 1, 1970 until June 30, 1970 (Exhibit P-7). On June
20, 1970, Taylor sent a notice of interest payment due June
30, 1970 for the sum of $6,817 .02 (Exhibit P-8). On July
29, 1970 New again wrote advising Taylor he would send the
payment on August 5, 1970 (Exhibit P-9). In October of
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1970 Taylor made a trip from his home in California to Salt
lake to try to collect the interest payment due on March 1,
1970 (R. 270). New promised that the payment would be
made and Taylor gave him 24 or 48 hours to raise the money
which was not done (R. 270). On November 24, 1970 Taylor
wrote New a letter reviewing the matter with him and advised him that he was irrevocably defaulted (Exhibit R. 11).
On November 19, 1970 New forwarded a letter and a
check in the amount of $7,025.28 covering the interest due
on March 1, 1970, with the accrued interest on interest.
On February 25, 1971 Taylor sent notice to New advising him of the principal and interest due on March 1, 1971
which was $25,000.00 for the principal payment and interest
in the amount of $5,837.00 covering the period March 1,
1970 to March 1, 1971. New failed to make payment, and
notice of the termination in accordance with the provisions of
the contract was given (Exhibit P-14) . The court found the
notice to be proper in all respects and no claim has been made
by appellant that it was defective.
It is obvious from the evidence that the respondent gaw
appellant ample opportunity to comply with the terms of the
agreement by giving him notice of the various payments and by
giving him extensions and that he was justified in terminating
the agreement. The equities are all in favor of the respondent.
Taylors were certainly not required to continue indefinitely
making concessions to the appellant which continued to ignore
the same and the trial court so found.
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Appellant contends it made a proper tender of interest
and principal payment in submiting its check for the sum
of $9,197.00 which was dated March 24, 1971 (Exhibit P-15).
The check was submitted as payment in full for the 1971 payment and annual interest. This was accompanied by a demand
for conveyance of .752 of an acre of ground which appellant
selected without discussion with respondent.
Whereas, the previous conveyances had all been along the
lot lines of the proposed subdivision, this request cut four lots
into segments and would leave some partial lots on the west
end of the property that would have limited, if any, use or
value for home construction (Exhibit P-2).
The tender was, therefore, not only improper with respect
to the amount of the principal and interest payment due but
also the appellant had no right under the terms of the contract to select or have conveyed to him, if the tender of payment had been proper, the acreage as requested.
The trial court's findings with respect to the default of
the appellant and no default whatever upon the part of the respondent is well supported by the evidence and should be
affirmed by the appellate court.
POINT

II

THE APPELLANT'S BREACH WAS SUBSTANTIAL AND DID WARRANT A TERMINATION
OF THE CONTRACT.
There was no forfeiture involved in the termination of
the contract. The appellant received all the land he paid for
under the contract and, in fact, received the choicest part of
the land to put on the Home Show ( R. 27 3).
17

There was no forfeiture of any land which had been paid
for and no forfeiture of any money which had been paid by
Corporation Nine to Taylor. The termination was for failure
to pay for land which was scheduled to be taken and actually
refused by the appellant by failure to make its payment. The
interest to be paid was interest already accrued and owing to
respondent as of March 1, 1971. Respondent had strictly
performed his contractual obligations according to the letter
and was prepared to deliver a deed to Corporation Nine upon
payment of the principal payment of $25,000.00 and interest.
Mr. Taylor still holds the title to the land that had not been
conveyed to Corporation Nine (R. 250). He was at all times
able to convey title to the appellant even though he had entered into a contract for sale of part of the property to Jerry
Young. The contract with Corporation Nine had been recorded prior to the recording of the contract with Jerry Young.
As a matter of fact, the court excluded this issue from the trial
(R. 220). Respondent after payment of the interest by Corporation Nine gave the appellant an additional opportunity
to keep the contract in effect even though he had been substantially in default on his interest payment for March 1, 1970
and gave him notice of the principal and interest payment due
on March 1, 1971, but with full know ledge of the consequences appellant elected to forego payment of the principal
sum which was the very heart of the contract as far as Taylor
was concerned. If Mr. New, the manager of Corporation Nine,
was misled, it was by his own failure to use reasonable diligence
to acquire knowledge of the facts and not by any misrepresentation or trickery on Taylor's part. The contract provided
that "time is the essence of the agreement" (Page 5, Exhibit
P-1).
J8

In the case of Woodard v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 220, 265 P.2d

398 our court affirmed the well known doctrine that marketability of title need only be determined as of the time purchaser tenders that which, under contract, would require vendor
to transfer title which he agreed to convey. See also Walker
v. Bintz and Shaw, 3 Utah 2d 162, 280 P.2d 767. The purchaser is not entitled to specific performance until he himself
has complied with his promises, the seller's duty to convey
being contingent upon the buyer's performance of his obligation to make a proper tender of the purchase price. It would
appear that Corporation Nine did not have the money to make
a proper tender, based on the difficulty it had in paying the
interest installment, and that it could not raise it.

If it were shown that Taylor's contract with Young was
valid and binding, Taylor might be subject to an action by
Young for failure to convey to him, but, nevertheless, he did
still have title to convey to appellant and even up to the final
default of appellant stood ready to do so.
The record does not support appellant's claim that there
was insufficient breach of the contract to warrant a termination.

POINT

III

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO TAKE
EVIDENCE ON THE AMOUNT OF THE ATTORNEY'S FEE TO BE AWARDED.
The court during the course of the trial and pursuant to
stipulation of counsel agreed to hear evidence pertaining to
the amount and reasonableness of the attorney's fee to be
awarded to the prevailing party which was to be done after
the court made its ruling ( R. 219). The court made an award
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of $1,000.00 as an attorney's fee without taking evidence but
acknowledged at the time of the argument of appellant's
motion for an order to amend findings and conclusions of law
or in the alternative for a new trial that it had overlooked this
stipulation. Counsel for respondent feels confident that the
trial court will hear evidence on the question of attorney's fees
on remand of the case back to the District Court but to protect itself on the record raises that matter on appeal. The case
of Provo City Corporation v. Cropper, 28 Utah 2d 1, 497
P.2d 629, is authority for the principle that it is improper to
make an award, in the absence of a stipulation as to the
amount, without taking evidence as to the reasonableness of
the fees.
Respondent should be allowed to put on evidence of his
attorney's fees.
Respondent also requests that the Supreme Court award
reasonable attorney's fees in connection with the handling of
the appeal in this case.

CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly ruled that the respondent Taylor
was not in default in any way in connection with its performance under the contract, that appellant clearly was in default
in failing to make the March 1, 1971 payment or proper
tender thereof. The Supreme Court should award reasonable
attorney's fees to the respondent in connection with the ser-
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vice pertaining to the appeal, affirm the trial court's judgment
except as to the amount awarded as attorney's fees and remand the case back to the trial court for hearing of evidence as
to the amount and reasonableness of the attorney's fee to be
awarded.
Respectfully submitted,
L. L. SUMMERHAYS of

STRONG & HANNI
604 Boston Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents
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